Rajiv's legacy: Putting the facts in place for posterity

Meera Shankar

IT was with the largest electoral victory in independent India that Rajiv Gandhi’s term began after Indira Gandhi’s assassination in 1984. But later this huge mandate became mired in controversies that obscured his many forward-looking initiatives.

Mani Shankar Aiyar’s The Rajiv I Knew is a labour of love to set the record straight on India’s “most misunderstood Prime Minister”. A close aide of Rajiv Gandhi, Aiyar has based the book on extensive research and makes a convincing case for a reassessment of Rajiv’s leadership.

Thrust into prime ministership in tragic circumstances and with little political experience, Rajiv brought a fresh perspective and sought to peacefully end violent internal conflicts in Punjab, Assam, Mizoram and J&K.  Some, like the Punjab Accord, and the alliance with the National Conference in J&K unravelled. Others were more successful.  

The 1985 Assam Accord brought the All-Assam Students’ Union to the negotiating table and later into government, reducing violence in the state. The Mizoram Accord was Rajiv’s most successful, ending one of the longest running insurgencies. The Mizo National Front was persuaded to lay down arms in return for its leader, Laldenga, becoming chief minister. Critical to the conclusion of these accords was Rajiv’s willingness to put the national interest above that of his party.

Panchayati Raj was given constitutional status and was, perhaps, Rajiv’s most transformative contribution. The legislation provided for regular elections to the Panchayats and municipal bodies with devolved powers for planning, economic development and social justice. And 33 percent  of seats were reserved for women. The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes would also be represented in proportion to their population. 

The Bill, which was introduced in the Lok Sabha in May 1989, was eventually passed in 1992, a year after Rajiv’s assassination. Panchayati Raj has truly revolutionized democratic participation at the grassroots and ensured the unprecedented inclusion of marginalized groups, but state governments have yet to devolve financial powers and resources. It was Aiyar’s close involvement in the evolution of Panchayati Raj that triggered his embrace of a career in politics.

Rajiv sought to harness the power of technology for solving everyday problems of health, communication, potable water and nutrition, leading to major advances in some of these sectors. His emphasis on computerization drew considerable media derision, but today information technology has become a key driver of India’s economy.

Rajiv’s visit to China was the first by an Indian prime minister after the 1962 border conflict. It set the stage for a thaw in relations while continuing discussions on a boundary settlement and peace and tranquility on the border. This led to the Agreement on Maintaining Peace and Tranquility along the border in 1993 and helped keep the peace for nearly three decades. However, the search for an acceptable solution to the boundary question failed to make headway.

New tensions have emerged in the wake of recent border intrusions by China in the Ladakh sector. Aiyar underlines the importance of working towards a fair boundary settlement with China. Undoubtedly, finding a fair and practical solution to the boundary question would be the key to building a more stable relationship with China. But is China, under Xi Jinping, ready for a border deal or does it seek to use the border dispute to keep India under pressure?

Rural realities: Rajiv and Sonia with Aiyar on a tour in Madhya Pradesh

Rajiv’s efforts to improve ties with Pakistan under President Zia-ul-Haq were undercut by Islamabad’s support to militancy in Punjab and J&K.  With the election of Benazir Bhutto in November 1988, a window of opportunity opened up. Rajiv visited Islamabad for the SAARC Summit in December 1988 with a half-day bilateral Rajiv-Benazir summit. The highlight of the visit was the conclusion of the Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities.

This significant nuclear CBM [confidence-building measure] helped lower nuclear risks for both countries. But, with Rajiv losing the general election soon after, the impetus petered out. Aiyar argues for insulating India-Pakistan relations against domestic compulsions. The most formidable obstacle to this remains Pakistan’s Army.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of July 1987 sought to find a political solution fair to both the Tamil and Sinhala communities in Sri Lanka but soon unravelled over the intransigence of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Sinhala chauvinism. An Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) sent at the request of President Jayawardene got sucked into an active fighting role against the LTTE. Rajiv paid with his life for listening to his advisers who, in my view, did not appreciate that military intervention in an open-ended situation, which did not lend itself to surgical action, was bound to end in failure. In contrast the military intervention in November 1988 in support of the Maldives government, which was facing a coup, was surgical and successful.

Rajiv was a staunch advocate of nuclear disarmament but advances by Pakistan towards nuclear weaponization forced his hand. A.Q. Khan told Kuldip Nayyar in January 1987 that Pakistan had the bomb. In March 1987, in an interview to Time magazine, President Zia said that “Pakistan has the capability to build the bomb….” Rajiv took a difficult decision and the Department of Atomic Energy secretly began developing nuclear weapons.

Though Aiyar does not touch on Rajiv’s economic policy, the gradual liberalization during his term delivered the highest industrial growth rates since Independence. Rajiv was poised to pursue a more determined economic liberalization, had he won the election.

Rajiv’s term as prime minister was dogged by controversies. It began with a bloodbath against the Sikh community in retaliation for the assassination of  Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards. The riots were eventually brought under control once Rajiv took charge.

The Bofors controversy petered out with no evidence emerging of any pay-offs to Rajiv Gandhi. The Supreme Court finally put an end to the controversy with its judgment of 2004 which held that no case had been made out. The ultimate vindication came in the Kargil conflict when the Bofors gun was critical to India’s success.

The decision to unlock the gates of the Babri Masjid has cast a long shadow on Indian politics, sharpening religious cleavages. Aiyar believes that the decision was taken behind Rajiv’s back. While this may or may not be the case, Rajiv did agree to the subsequent shilanyas. This alienated the Muslim community and was instrumental in Rajiv’s defeat at the hustings.

When he became prime minister, Rajiv had little experience of the intrigues of Indian politics. Straightforward and confident by nature, he trusted his advisers to a fault. He did not understand how proximity to power changes people and that leadership at the top is, essentially, a lonely place. What he did strive for, with the energy of youth, was to address India’s political cleavages, empower democracy at the grassroots and bring the force of technology to bear on solving problems of India’s development. Aiyer’s book is a must-read for a fair assessment of someone who could have become one of India’s transformative leaders, had he survived.     

(Meera Shankar served in the PMO and was later India’s Ambassador in Washington.)