‘Possible to bolster security without harming ecology’

Civil Society News, New Delhi

IS the huge investment in a transshipment port and other infrastructure on the Great Nicobar Island really needed to bolster India’s strategic presence in the region? Or would a lighter touch with the reinforcing of current defence facilities have been enough?

Admiral Arun Prakash believes that a lighter touch would have worked just as well. Admiral Prakash, now retired and living in Goa, is a former Navy chief. He was head of the joint command of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

Admiral Prakash says strengthening of India’s presence is needed. But it could be achieved by merely expanding India’s defence capabilities on the Great Nicobar and also using some of the smaller islands if required. In this way, there wouldn’t be the ecological damage that is going to be caused by large commercial facilities.

 

Q: Can you tell our readers why the islands are of great strategic significance and suddenly an urgent national security issue?

My connection to the islands goes back to 2001, when I was posted as Commander-in-Chief of the newly formed Andaman and Nicobar Command. Till then the islands had been looked after by the Navy. Fortress Andaman Nicobar, located there, was manned by only the Navy, with small elements of the Air Force and Army made available.

After the 1999 Kargil War, a major defence review took place, and one of its outcomes was that the Government of India decided to bolster the security of the A&N islands. To this end, it was decided to create a joint command in the A&N islands, with a Commander-in-Chief who would have under his command elements of the services — the Army, Navy, Air Force — as well as the Coast Guard.

The Andaman and Nicobar archipelago, as we know, is strategically located in the middle of the Bay of Bengal, almost equidistant between the Indian peninsula and Southeast Asia. Myanmar and Thailand are quite close, and the northern tip of Indonesia is just about 90 miles from the southernmost island, which is Great Nicobar Island or GNI. 

Given this location, and the fact that the Andaman and Nicobar archipelago dominates the shipping lanes which run from the Pacific, through the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and then on to Europe, it occupies a very strategic position.

If we go back into history, the Japanese, within weeks of the Pearl Harbor attack (in December 1941), swept across Southeast Asia and by March 1942 had occupied the Andaman and Nicobar islands, chasing out the British garrison. Having established their HQ in Port Blair, they were going to use the islands as the springboard for their invasion of India, which never came about.

Then, we come to the time of Independence. Pakistan’s Mohammad Ali Jinnah made a bid for these islands, basing his claim on the fact that they lay on the sea route from West Pakistan to East Pakistan. At the same time, the UK Chiefs of Staff told their government that these islands were of strategic value to British interests in the East, and should be retained as Crown possessions. I think we should consider it fortunate that, for various reasons, the British agreed to oblige Nehru, and handed over the islands to India.

I gave this background to highlight the strategic importance of these islands to India, and why we cannot afford to neglect them. They can be a springboard for India to implement whatever policy initiatives it wants in the strategic sphere. On the other hand, if they fall into the hands of an adversary power, they can pose a huge threat to India. Their strategic importance to India is increasing by the day — given the emergence of China and the Indo-Pacific paradigm. 

 

Q: Despite the fact that we have remained in control of the islands, is our possession of them inadequate? 

Well, it is not inadequate but it needs to be reinforced. The archipelago spans 700 to 800 miles, north to south, but since most of the islands are uninhabited, it is up to us to bolster our presence so that our possession of the islands cannot be challenged. At this moment, we are there, our forces are there, the islands seem well protected, but who can predict the future? 

 

Q: What would be the advantage of this huge project which we are undertaking on the Great Nicobar Island? What is the strategic value we gain from it?  

The Great Nicobar Island is one of the largest islands in that chain and, as I pointed out, as the southernmost island it is closest to Indonesia and the Malacca Strait. This strait is the shortest, safest and most economical exit and entry point for all the shipping that traverses to and from the Pacific and Indian Oceans, carrying oil, energy, raw material and other trade.

If you create a military stronghold in the Great Nicobar then you can dominate the Malacca Strait very conspicuously. We already have a presence on this island, by way of a small airstrip, a naval air station, a minor port and a small garrison — all on the eastern side of the island. There is room to bolster, expand and reinforce the existing military presence and infrastructure. I would imagine that there is plenty of land or space available without significantly disturbing or disrupting any of the valuable ecological or anthropologic assets of the island.

And, secondly, if you still want more land for military infrastructure, there are other islands just north of Great Nicobar where you could accommodate an airfield and a port.

 

Q: What can be done to meet strategic objectives and still have a lighter touch on the environment?

If you’re only thinking of bolstering your security capabilities, there is adequate space on the eastern part of  the Great Nicobar. As I mentioned, the minor port in Campbell Bay, the existing airstrip and the army garrison all have room for expansion and extension to meet enhanced security requirements. There are also smaller islands to the north of the Great Nicobar which could accommodate airfields, harbours and garrisons.

 

Q: How imminent is the danger of China occupying these islands in military terms?  

While it may have been a possibility a few decades ago, it is a far-fetched idea today. The nearest Chinese naval base, in Hainan, is about 3,000 miles away. Moreover, they’ve got many other problems at their doorstep that they need to worry about; like Taiwan, for instance. On the other hand, Deng Xiaoping admitted in 2003, soon after we formed the Andaman Nicobar Command, that China faced a “Malacca dilemma”.

Deng coined this phrase because he felt that closing of the Malacca Strait by an adversary could form an “iron chain around China’s neck”. He was referring to the fact that almost 80 to 90 percent of China’s energy trade, raw materials, finished goods, etc, passes through the Malacca Strait. Any power which decides to interfere, interdict, or choke off this area can cause immense damage to China’s economy, industry, trade and so on.

So, it is China that should be worried about what happens in the Malacca Strait rather than us running scared of somebody coming and occupying the islands.

 

Q: Does our attempt to bolster our presence by having this extensive form of development on the Great Nicobar change the strategic environment in any way?

Of course it will. If you’re going to spend `72,000 crore in developing an island which is sitting at the mouth of the Malacca Strait, it’s going to send a huge message and may even ring alarm bells in the region. It may possibly be resented in Indonesia, which is next door, or in Malaysia, because it spells “competition” in many spheres. So, it is a very significant message, there is no doubt about it. 

 

Q: But what should the priorities be for the development and ecology of the islands? Or is defence the single biggest priority?   

When I was the Commander-in-Chief, all these issues were of concern. But they needed to be looked at in three separate boxes. One was the welfare of the islanders, because the economy is, as you know, very minimal. They live mostly on support from the mainland. There is a need to develop the islands so that they can become as self-sustaining as possible and people can earn a living on their own.

It was quite apparent that there were two main areas in which the economy could be expanded on a sustainable basis — tourism and fisheries. The islands have a huge exclusive economic zone where our fishermen are seen occasionally, but neighbours’ trawlers come in and take away a huge catch. We hardly have any fishing initiatives on an industrial scale, just small trawlers and little canoes, etc.

The other was the ecology. Many of the islands are in a pristine state. You have tribes that have lived there continuously for millennia — unspoilt by “civilization”. This is very precious heritage which we need to protect and preserve for as long as possible.

And the third factor was security. In which order of priority you consider these three depends on who you are. As Commander-in-Chief, security came first for me.  At that point of time (2001-03), we had put forward a plan which ensured that we had a military “presence” from north to south with adequate forces to deter and, if required, arrest foreign trespassers, poachers and illegal fishermen. While some of our proposals did receive approval, many requirements remained unfulfilled due to the internal dynamics of the service HQs.

However, much has changed since and now one understands that there is a security presence right across the islands. From north to south, there’s a Naval Air Base in Diglipur, close to Myanmar; then, in the middle, there is a Naval Base and Naval Air Base as well as Army presence in Port Blair; further south we have Car Nicobar which is an Air Force Station; and finally, in the south there is Great Nicobar, which I have already described.  The current presence can be built upon and bolstered by inducting more units, more firepower as well as sensors like radars, etc.

Is there any conflict between ecology and security? This is not really within my purview but I would say that if there is a conflict, there is enough room to accommodate all concerns and achieve a balance.

 

Q: In purely commercial terms, do you see a large port over there being viable?

I’m not an expert so I’m not going to claim any great depth of knowledge here. However, common sense tells me that in the vicinity of the Great Nicobar, there are ports like Singapore, Port Klang in Malaysia, and Hambantota, created by the Chinese for Sri Lanka. A little farther on is the large port of Colombo. All these ports constitute what are called “transshipment ports” for India.

This is because most Indian ports are unable to cope with large container-carrying ships. So right now most container traffic destined for Indian ports is off-loaded in one of these transshipment ports. Smaller ships which can dock in Indian ports pick up goods from these ports and bring them to India.

 The ports I mention are old, established transshipment ports. Very recently, we’ve also proudly inaugurated Vizhinjam Port in Kerala, touted as the first Indian transshipment port, which is meant to take away traffic from Colombo Port. 

To my mind, given the close proximity of these ports, it will take considerable time for a new port like Great Nicobar to establish itself, and begin taking away traffic from these ports. I’m sure experts have examined this issue but, to my mind, I would say that it will take time for a new  port to be able to compete with existing ports which have been around for many years and are very efficient.

Secondly, a major port in Great Nicobar will lack a hinterland. I am not familiar with the proposed master plan but currently the rest of the island is just tropical jungle, tribals, crocodiles and the Galathea river. Let’s remember the geographic remoteness of Great Nicobar. It is 1,000 km from Chennai, 2,000 km from Kolkata. It would be a matter of time, perhaps several decades, before such a port becomes established. It can, happen, but it will take time and a major struggle before it can become
a reality.